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complaint to cross ‗ the line between possibility and
plausibility of entitlement to relief.‘‖).
As always, the above standard is applied in light o f Rule
8(a)‘s requirement of only ― a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relie f.‖ Fed. R.
Civ. P. 8(a)(2). However, although Rule 8(a) ―marks a notable
and generous departure from the hyper-technical, co de-pleading
regime of a prior era, . . . it does not unlock the doors of
discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more t han
conclusions.‖ Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1950.
B. Rule 12(c)
Rule 12(c) provides that ―[a]fter the pleadings are closed—
but early enough not to delay trial —a party may move for
judgment on the pleadings.‖ Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). As noted
above, although Officer Briggs‘ motion was filed pu rsuant to
Rule 12(b)(6), it is properly considered a motion p ursuant to
Rule 12(c) because an answer was filed contemporane ously with
such motion. Walker v. Kelly, 589 F.3d 127, 139 (4 th Cir.
2009). However, this distinction has no practical effect on the
Court‘s adjudication of Officer Briggs‘ motion, because ―a
motion under Rule 12(c) . . . is assessed under the same
standard that applies to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.‖ Id. (citing
Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243 (4t h Cir.
1999)). Jump to an indexed page (39 of 39)