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sufficiently alleged a constitutional violation com mitted by
Officer Briggs, the Court must address whether such violation
can somehow be attributed to Sergeant Gayle.
―As a general matter, a law officer may incur § 1983
liability only through affirmative misconduct .‖ Randall v.
Prince George‘ s Cnty., Maryland, 302 F.3d 188, 202 (4th Cir.
2002). However, the Fourth Circuit recognizes a li mited
exception to such general rule whereby a law enforc ement officer
may be liable under § 1983 on the theory of ―bystander
liability.‖ Id. at 203. Such concept is ―premised on a law
officer‘s duty to uphold the law and protect the public fro m
illegal acts, regardless of who commits them,‖ and is applicable
if ― a bystanding officer (1) is confronted with a fello w
officer‘s illegal act, (2) possesses the power to prevent i t,
and (3) chooses not to act . . . .‖ Id.
Here, first considering Briggs‘ decision to arrest
plaintiff, Plaintiff alleges that Gayle was present at the scene
of her arrest, and that he ―fail[ed] . . . to inter vene and come
to the aid of Hales, or take corrective action upon observing
[Briggs‘] misconduct . . . .‖ (Compl. ¶ 26). As the court has
already determined that Plaintiff has sufficiently stated a §
1983 claim for an unreasonable seizure against Brig gs, assuming
the above facts to be true, the Court must similarl y find that
Plaintiff has stated a plausible right to relief ag ainst Jump to an indexed page (39 of 39)