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Finding Plaintiff‘s allegations sufficient to state a §
1983 claim against Briggs, the Court must consider whether the
doctrine of qualified immunity shields Briggs from liability.
―Qualified immunity protects officers who commit con stitutional
violations but who, in light of clearly established law, could
reasonably believe that their actions were lawful. ‖ Henry v.
Purnell, __ F.3d __, 2011 WL 2725816, at *4 (4th Ci r. July 14,
2011). In other words, municipal officers are immu ne from §
1983 liability unless a plaintiff‘s ―§ 1983 claim satisfies a
two-prong test: (1) the allegations, if true, subst antiate a
violation of a federal statutory or constitutional right and (2)
the right wa s ‗clearly established‘ such that a reasonable
person would have known his acts or omissions viola ted that
right.‖ Brockington v. Boykins, 637 F.3d 503, 506 (4th Cir.
2011) (citing Ridpath v. Board of Governors Marshal l University,
447 F.3d 292, 306 (4th Cir. 2006)). Qualified immu nity provides
―an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability,‖
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985), and therefore
―should be resolved at the earliest possible stage of the
litigation.‖ Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 646 n.6
(1987).
those complaints; and (3) the plaintiff experienced ‗some
physical injury‘ resulting from the handcuffing‖). The instant
facts are therefore distinguishable from the facts of Carter,
and sufficiently state a § 1983 excessive force claim. Jump to an indexed page (39 of 39)