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Plaintiff likewise fails to state a claim by advanc ing the
bald conclusion that ―all actions and words of the Newport News
policemen alleged above were intentional and reckle ss with the
specific purpose of inflicting emotional distress,‖ Compl. ¶ 17,
as such statement falls far short of the pleading s tandard under
Twombly and its progeny. To the contrary, this is precisely the
type of unsubstantiated conclusory statement that f ails to
satisfy the applicable pleading standard. Accordin gly, Gayle‘s
and Briggs‘ motions to dismiss Count Two are granted.
2. Counts Three through Five – Assault, Battery, and
False Imprisonment
Defendant Gayle seeks dismissal of Counts Three thr ough
Five of the Complaint, respectively alleging assaul t, battery,
and false impriso nment, based on Plaintiff‘s failure to either
specifically name Gayle in such counts or otherwise demonstrate
that Gayle participated in Plaintiff‘s arrest. Additionally,
both Gayle and Briggs seek dismissal of such counts based on
their assertion that Pl aintiff‘s own facts demonstrate that
Briggs had a reasonable basis for arresting plaintiff.
Assault requires an act ―that creates in [another] p erson‘s
mind a reasonable apprehension of an imminent batte ry.‖ Koffman
plead an independent state-law tort claim for inten tional
infliction of emotional distress. The resolution o f such a
pleading deficiency is unrelated to whether Plainti ff can
ultimately demonstrate that her damages, recoverabl e under §
1983, include compensable emotional suffering. Jump to an indexed page (39 of 39)