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unreasonable that it ―would shock fair minded men.‖ Ferguson,
212 Va. at 92, 181 S.E.2d at 653; see Waterman v. B atton, 393
F.3d 471, 476 –77 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 396-97 (1989)) (―Because ‗police officers are often
forced to make split-second judgments —in circumstances that are
tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving,‘ the facts must be
evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable offi cer on the
scene, and th e use of hindsight must be avoided.‖). 15
Accordingly, as Plaintiff fails to sufficiently all ege that
Briggs was grossly negligent in arresting her, and fails to even
allege that Gayle was present at the police station or during
her transport thereto, Gayle‘s motion to dismiss Co unt Six is
granted.
b. Officer Briggs
As discussed immediately above, Plaintiff‘s own fac ts
demonstrate that Officer Briggs, even if mistaken a nd/or
negligent in deciding to arrest Plaintiff, was not grossly
negligent in deciding to effectuate such arrest. I n contrast,
Plaintiff appears to have asserted sufficient facts to state a
15 The applicable Virginia Statute states, in relevant part,
that:
A law-enforcement officer having probable cause to
believe that a [battery against a family member] . . .
has occurred shall arrest and take into custody the
person he has probable cause to believe, based on the
totality of the circumstances, was the predominant
physical aggressor . . . .
VA Code § 19.2-81.3. Jump to an indexed page (39 of 39)