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Here, qualified immunity does not shield Briggs fro m
liability for either Plaintiff‘s § 1983 claim challenging the
constitutionality of her arrest or the § 1983 claim challenging
the level of force allegedly used in effectuating s uch arrest.
As discussed above, Plaintiff has sufficiently alle ged a
violation of her Fourth Amendment rights, i.e. that ―the
allegations, if true, substantiate a violation of a federal
statutory or constitution al right.‖ It is likewise apparent
that, at the time of Plaintiff‘s arrest, it was ―clearly
established‖ that arresting a person for gently touching her
spouse on the wrist or repeatedly refusing to check on a secured
detainee‘s handcuffs after numerous pleas of severe pain
violated such rights. See, e.g., Morrison v. Board of Trustees
of Green Twp., 583 F.3d 394, 401 (6th Cir. 2009) (i ndicating
that it is ―clearly established‖ that the Fourth Am endment
―prohibits unduly tight or excessively forceful hand cuffing‖).
A reasonable officer thus would have known that the actions
taken by Briggs violated Plaintiff‘s constitutional rights.
Accordingly, Officer Briggs‘ motion to dismiss is d enied with
respect to Count Seven.
2. § 1983 Claim against Gayle
As discussed previously, Plaintiff fails to allege that
Gayle actively participated in her arrest or in the alleged
application of excessive force. However, because P laintiff has Jump to an indexed page (39 of 39)