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Officer Riley knew about these issues with L.C.’s allegations and therefore asserted that it was
“reckless, careless, and willfully indifferent” for Officer Riley to pursue the warrants.
The appellees each filed pleas in bar and demurrers. Relevant to this appeal, appellees
specifically asserted a plea in bar on the theory that the existence of probable cause barred
Cline’s claims for malicious prosecution. All parties agreed to a hearing on appellees’
responsive motions on February 4, 2025. At that hearing, the court sustained Drew’s demurrer,
overruled Riley’s demurrer, and allowed Ross to withdraw her demurrer.5 Turning to the pleas
in bar, Officer Riley’s counsel offered the following exhibits over Cline’s objection: (1) the order
and motion appointing the special prosecutor, (2) the transcript from the preliminary hearing, (3)
the grand jury true bills, (4) the transcript from the jury trial, (5) the final order from the jury
trial, and (6) the eight arrest warrants issued against Cline.
After argument, the court granted in part and denied in part the pleas in bar based on
intervening and superseding findings of probable cause. While the court did not find that the
magistrate’s decision to grant the warrants was an intervening cause itself, it found that: (1) the
special prosecutor’s decision to advance the case, (2) the JDR court’s certification of the charges
to the grand jury, (3) the grand jury’s true bills of indictment on each charge, (4) the trial court’s
denial of Cline’s motion to strike, and (5) the trial court’s denial of Cline’s renewed motion to
strike were all separate and independent intervening causes. Thus, the circuit court found that
probable cause existed in this case as a matter of law, and granted the pleas in bar. Accordingly,
the court dismissed Cline’s complaint.6
5 After the court ruled on Riley’s plea in bar, it allowed Ross to withdraw her demurrer
because Riley’s plea in bar and Ross’s demurrer were similar.
6 As a result of dismissing Cline’s entire complaint, the pleas in bar related to Cline’s
claims for punitive damages were also moot. However, the circuit court found that Cline could
still assert claims based on “the arrest, the consequences of the arrest, [and] any publicity that
may have occurred” prior to the commencement of the preliminary hearing. Jump to an indexed page (13 of 13)