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special pleas—also operate to bar Cline’s malicious prosecution complaint. There were probable
cause findings by every decision maker in the underlying prosecution, including: the magistrate,
the special prosecutor, the JDR court, the grand jury, and the trial court. While Riley’s account
of L.C.’s claims may have been the initiation of the proceedings, each subsequent determination
of probable cause was evidence that was presented to the circuit court in the special pleas.
Additionally, the circuit court also believed that the special prosecutor’s continuing work on
Cline’s prosecution evidenced a separate basis of probable cause. And as stated, the JDR and
trial courts, after hearing L.C.’s testimony, believed there was probable cause. Finally, the trial
court denied Cline’s motion to strike as well as her renewed motion to strike because it found
that the Commonwealth had met its burden in its prima facie case and that it had presented
sufficient evidence for the jury to determine Cline’s guilt.
Because intervening and superseding findings of probable cause may be considered, these
separate findings—which the circuit court reviewed in the special pleas—constitute a valid
defense to a malicious prosecution action. Accordingly, the circuit court did not err by
dismissing Cline’s malicious prosecution complaint.
V. It was not inconsistent for the circuit court to grant appellee Officer Riley’s plea in bar while
overruling her demurrer.
Cline argues that it was legally inconsistent for the circuit court to overrule Officer
Riley’s demurrer, to then grant Officer Riley’s plea in bar based on probable cause as a matter of
law. Simply, Cline believes that if she succeeded on one of the appellees’ motions, she should
have succeeded on all others. We disagree.12
12 On this assignment of error, the parties craft their arguments using Rollins v. Consol.
Bank & Trust Co., 54 Va. Cir. 147 (Richmond 2000), and Chipouras v. AJ&L Corp., 223 Va.
511 (1982). We find that this assignment of error is best disposed of by distinguishing the
standards for demurrers and pleas in bar. Hannah v. Commonwealth, 303 Va. 109, 121 (2024)
(“Judicial restraint dictates that we decide our cases on the best and narrowest grounds available
to us.”). Jump to an indexed page (13 of 13)