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Those factors include: “the threatening presence of a number of police officers, the
display of weapons by officers, physical contact between an officer and a citizen, an officer’s
language or tone of voice compelling compliance, . . . and whether a citizen was told that he or
she was free to leave.” Id. As a result, “[t]here are no bright line rules to follow when
determining whether a reasonable and articulable suspicion exists to justify an investigatory stop.
Instead, courts must consider ‘the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture.’” Hoye v.
Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 132, 134-35 (1994) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1,
8 (1989)).
“While the police are regularly required to rely on their experience and instincts, the
[F]ourth [A]mendment requires, at a minimum, that they possess articulable facts giving rise to
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity before depriving a citizen of his or her privacy or
freedom of movement.” Goodwin v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 363, 367 (1990). Indeed,
according to Terry “and its progeny, a police officer ‘may constitutionally conduct a brief,
investigatory stop when the officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is
afoot.’” Bland v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 405, 413 (2016) (quoting Beasley v.
Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 381, 395 (2012)).
“Under the Fourth Amendment, ‘the relevant inquiry is not whether particular conduct is
“innocent” or “guilty,” but the degree of suspicion that attaches to particular types of
noncriminal acts.’” Rabb v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 577, 583 (2007) (quoting Sokolow,
490 U.S. at 10). Rather, “[r]easonable, articulable suspicion requires an officer to possess, at the
time of the stop, ‘a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person
stopped[.]’” Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 234, 246 (2021) (second alteration in
original) (quoting Heien v. North Carolina, 574 U.S. 54, 60 (2014)). “Whether reasonable
suspicion exists is ‘based on an assessment of the totality of the circumstances.’” McArthur v.
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