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Pearson v. Commonwealth — Court of Appeals opinion, 2002-22-1

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- 16 - C. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it refused to admit evidence that Pearson knew a protective order had been entered against Berry. Pearson also asserts that the trial court erred in refusing admission of evidence demonstrating Pearson’s knowledge of the protective order limiting Berry’s contact with his son. He bases this contention upon two arguments. First, he contends that because Pearson’s knowledge of the protective order factored into his decision-making process and the formation of probable cause to arrest Berry, it was relevant and material evidence. Second, he argues that preventing the jury from hearing about the protective order allowed the Commonwealth to argue disingenuously that Berry was a concerned father, thus portraying him as a sympathetic victim to the jury. We disagree. “All relevant evidence is admissible . . . .” Va. R. Evid. 2:402. “Evidence that is not relevant is not admissible.” Id. “Evidence is relevant if it has any logical tendency, however slight, to establish a fact at issue in the case.” Utz v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 411, 418 (1998) (quoting Ragland v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 913, 918 (1993)). “‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact in issue more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” Va. R. Evid. 2:401. Whether Pearson had probable cause to arrest Berry is irrelevant because, as discussed above, the attempted arrest was illegal because it occurred in Berry’s home without a warrant. Since the entire question of probable cause is irrelevant, Pearson’s knowledge of the protective order factoring into the formation of probable cause and Pearson’s decision to attempt to arrest Berry is also irrelevant. The trial court did not err in excluding this irrelevant and therefore inadmissible piece of evidence. Thus, the ruling of the trial court is affirmed. Finally, Pearson made no objection to the Commonwealth’s argument that Berry was a concerned father. Rule 5A:18 precludes our review of any error the trial court was not given an opportunity to cure. Commonwealth v. Bass, 292 Va. 19, 26 (2016) (“The rule requires litigants to
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