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Pearson v. Commonwealth — Court of Appeals opinion, 2002-22-1

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- 13 - Further, unlike Santana, there was no concern that unless an arrest was made speedily, evidence of the crime would be lost. Id. at 43 (“Once Santana saw the police, there was likewise a realistic expectation that any delay would result in destruction of evidence.”). Instead, call records and witness testimony constituting evidence of the alleged false reports were entirely safe from any destruction by Berry. Because Berry was in the constitutionally protected sphere of his home when the arrest was initiated, there was no pursuit beginning in a public place, and there was no fear that Berry could destroy evidence, this case is distinguishable from and not governed by Santana. Rather, for the same preceding reasons, Pearson’s attempted arrest was in violation of Berry’s Fourth Amendment rights. Alternatively, Pearson argues that entry of the apartment was justified by the presence of exigent circumstances. We also find this reasoning unavailing. The exigent circumstances “exception applies when ‘the exigencies of the situation’ make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” White v. Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 535, 553 (2021) (quoting Ross, 61 Va. App. at 759). There is no “final and comprehensive list of all exigent circumstances which might justify a warrantless entry.” Verez v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 405, 410 (1985). However, the Supreme Court has recognized several considerations relevant to determining if an exigency exists justifying warrantless entry of the home: (1) the degree of urgency involved and the time required to get a warrant; (2) the officers’ reasonable belief that contraband is about to be removed or destroyed; (3) the possibility of danger to others, including police officers left to guard the site; (4) information that the possessors of the contraband are aware that the police may be on their trail; (5) whether the offense is serious, or involves violence; (6) whether officers reasonably believe the suspects are armed; (7) whether there is, at the time of entry, a clear showing of probable cause; (8) whether the officers have a strong reason to believe the suspects are actually present in the premises; (9) the likelihood of
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