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Id. at 42-43. Finally, the Supreme Court noted that “there was likewise a realistic expectation that
any delay would result in destruction of evidence.” Id.
Pearson contends that the only difference between the facts here and in Santana is that Berry
was under suspicion of committing a misdemeanor rather than a felony. He asserts that this
difference is insignificant and does not warrant distinguishing this case from the Santana decision.
He implicitly argues that Berry was in public when officers initiated the arrest and that his flight
back into his apartment justified police entry of the home.
We disagree that suspicion of a misdemeanor as opposed to suspicion of a felony constitutes
the only difference between the facts in the case at bar and those in Santana. We are aided in our
analysis by the facts and reasoning in United States v. McCraw, 920 F.2d 224 (4th Cir. 1990). In
that case, several federal law enforcement agents knocked on the door of a hotel room. Id. at 226.
The agents had probable cause to suspect the occupant of the room had illegally distributed cocaine,
but they had not obtained a warrant for his arrest. Id. at 228. The defendant “opened the door about
halfway while standing inside his room,” but when he saw the agents, “he attempted to close the
door.” Id. at 226. “Several officers with weapons drawn forced their way inside and arrested” him.
Id. The Fourth Circuit found that one “does not surrender his expectation of privacy nor consent to
[law enforcement’s] entry” when one “partially opens the door to determine the identity of officers
knocking on the door.” Id. at 228. Urged by the government to find Santana dispositive, the Fourth
Circuit distinguished the facts in the two cases, noting that:
the arrestee in the present case was not standing on the threshold of
the doorway at the time the agents arrived. Instead, [the arrestee]
came to the door in response to the agents’ knocking. Moreover, [the
arrestee] did not relinquish completely his expectation of privacy. At
trial, government witnesses did not even contend that [the arrestee]
was on the threshold of the doorway, instead admitting that he
opened the door only halfway to determine who was knocking,
attempted to close it, and that they forced their way inside to make
the arrest. By opening the door only halfway, [the arrestee] did not
voluntarily expose himself to the public to the same extent as the Jump to an indexed page (18 of 18)