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traffic stop had not ended, because, as Knight-Walker has consistently argued, “Officer Allen
had not yet returned [her] identification card or issued her a warning or traffic summons.”
What is more, the majority concedes that “had Allen initiated the new line of inquiry
after Knight-Walker called her son and while both Knight-Walker and Allen were waiting for the
son to arrive, the evidence seized as a result of the search would not be excluded.” But the
majority fails to explain how the mission of the traffic stop could still be ongoing after the call
was made while, at the same time, have already ended before the call was placed. Both cannot
be true. Either Knight-Walker was free to walk away before the questioning took place and wait
for a ride elsewhere, or she was not. Indeed, the majority’s reasoning here mirrors the analysis
the circuit court undertook (but which the majority purports to reject) in finding the mission of
the traffic stop was ongoing because Knight-Walker could not drive away from the scene while
her license was suspended).
As Knight-Walker’s counsel suggested at oral argument, the phone call is a red herring.
So is the question of whether the mission of the traffic stop was lawfully extended until Knight-
Walker’s ride arrived.14 Knight-Walker’s consent gave Officer Allen a basis to search her
vehicle.15 Knight-Walker argues that this evidence following this consent search must be
suppressed because Officer Allen asked her 12 seconds of unrelated questions. But, as explained
above, Rodriguez does not impose this per se rule. Instead, the question under Rodriguez is
14 In essence, I find the court was right for a different, simpler reason. Under the right
result different reason principle, an appellate court does not hesitate to sustain the result on an
alternative ground where the correct conclusion has been reached. Vandyke v. Commonwealth,
71 Va. App. 723, 731 (2020). As such, I “express no view on the correctness of the lower
court’s rationale.” Rickman v. Commonwealth, 294 Va. 534, 542 (2017).
15 On this point, the majority again expands Knight-Walker’s argument by suggesting
that “the search itself . . . delayed the completion of the traffic stop.” I respectfully disagree that
the time it took to complete the search is relevant as the search was authorized by Knight-
Walker’s consent. The only question (the one raised by Knight-Walker) is whether the
questioning before that consent improperly extended the stop. Jump to an indexed page (23 of 23)