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Knight-Walker v. Commonwealth — 2025 opinion, later reversed

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- 11 - These investigatory inquiries unnecessarily delayed the completion of the traffic stop. Allen did so in order to search the vehicle for drugs or weapons without any reasonable articulable suspicion of either. There was every indication that Allen was basically finished with the stop, except for returning Knight-Walker’s license, and delayed her ability to “get somebody here and drive the car away” by repeatedly asking her whether he could just go ahead and search her vehicle “real quick”—even though there was no reasonable articulable suspicion of any contraband in the car.8 Knight-Walker could have contacted her son and he could have been on the way but for these repeated requests to search. Therefore, the search itself delayed the phone call and also delayed the completion of the traffic stop. B. Knight-Walker’s Free and Voluntary Consent “Consent loses its validity only if it is involuntary or, [is] the product of a manipulative ‘exploitation’ by the police of an earlier unconstitutional search or seizure.” Kyer v. Commonwealth, 45 Va. App. 473, 483 (2005) (citations omitted). Because Allen impermissibly exceeded the bounds of the stop, he unlawfully detained Knight-Walker and thus unconstitutionally infringed upon an area protected by the Fourth Amendment when he searched Knight-Walker’s vehicle. Consequently, Knight-Walker’s consent to the search of her vehicle or person was “tainted by the illegality and was ineffective to justify the search.” Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 507-08 (1983). Allen’s repeated questions about the presence of drugs in the vehicle and his insistence that a search would be “real quick,” delaying Knight-Walker from contacting her son and impermissibly extending the amount of time necessary to complete the traffic stop, invalidated any consent Knight-Walker gave Allen to search the vehicle. Because 8 Under our analysis, we acknowledge that had Allen initiated the new line of inquiry after Knight-Walker called her son and while both Knight-Walker and Allen were waiting for the son to arrive, the evidence seized as a result of the search would not be excluded. However, it is Allen’s interruption of Knight-Walker’s ability to “get someone here and drive the car” and impermissibly extend this encounter that constitutes a violation of the Fourth Amendment.
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