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On October 19, 2023, appellees demurred and filed pleas in bar to the complaint. They
asserted that a permit application is governed by the law in effect when the application is
decided—rather than the law in effect when the application is submitted—and that they were
not required to process the application before this amendment’s effective date. See Code
§ 15.2-2286(A)(4) (“The zoning administrator shall respond within 90 days of a request for a
decision or determination on zoning matters within the scope of his authority unless the
requester has agreed to a longer period.”). Appellees also echoed Ms. Hall’s assertion that the
amendment merely clarified size restrictions already in the previous version of the zoning
ordinance. Appellees additionally contended that Adams was not entitled to declaratory or
mandamus relief because (1) other forms of relief were available (namely, the normal appeals
process); and (2) declaratory and mandamus relief are prospective only and cannot be used to
adjudicate the propriety of past actions like the denial of Adams’ applications. Further, they
argued that Adams was not entitled to a writ of mandamus because Ms. Hall’s duty was
discretionary, not ministerial.
Almost one year later, after settlement negotiations fell apart, Adams opposed the
demurrer and pleas in bar and moved the circuit court for leave to amend its complaint. Adams
proffered an amended complaint that added three new claims to the original claims for
declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus: (1) an equal protection claim under the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C § 1983; (2) a business conspiracy
claim under Code § 18.2-499; and (3) an inverse condemnation claim under Article I, § 11 of the Jump to an indexed page (13 of 13)