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Here, after hearing argument and ruling orally on Adams’ motion for leave to amend its
complaint, the court wrote in its final order that “amendment of the Plaintiff’s Complaint would
be futile because the deficiencies found by the Court cannot be remedied.” But Adams made no
objection to the court’s decision at the motion hearing, nor did it file a motion to reconsider,
giving the circuit court the opportunity to rule intelligently on its specific objection. To be sure,
Adams objected to the court’s denial of its motion for leave to amend in its endorsement of the
court’s final order. But that objection merely stated that “[l]eave to amend should be liberally
granted in furtherance of the ends of justice” and that Adams’ amended complaint “would have
stated additional claims for relief against defendants.” It did not address with any particularity
the circuit court’s finding that “the deficiencies found by the Court cannot be remedied.”
Adams’ objection was insufficiently specific, so its argument is procedurally defaulted
under Rule 5A:18.5 Appalachian Voices, 277 Va. at 515. And because a finding of legal futility
is an independently sufficient ground to deny leave to amend a complaint, we need not address
5 Even if Adams had properly preserved its argument, we would still affirm the circuit
court’s judgment because the additional facts and allegations in Adams’ second amended
complaint fail to state a claim and are therefore legally futile. Allegheny Constr. Co. v. Town of
Christiansburg, 86 Va. App. 321, 347 (2025) (holding that “when the proffered facts show the
plaintiff cannot state an actionable claim,” proffered amendments are legally futile and the circuit
court “need not permit amendment”). First, Adams’ equal protection claim fails because by
providing no specifics about Kenjoh’s applications (e.g., the size or location of its proposed
signs), Adams fails to allege either that it is “similarly situated” to Kenjoh or “that there is no
rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Vill. of Willowbrook. v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564
(2000); see also Sas Assocs. 1, LLC v. City Council for the City of Chesapeake, 91 F.4th 715,
722 (4th Cir. 2024) (“To establish a class-of-one [equal protection] claim, a person complaining
of a zoning decision must . . . ‘show an extremely high degree of similarity between themselves
and the persons to whom they compare themselves.’” (quoting Clubside, Inc. v. Valentin, 468
F.3d 144, 159 (2d Cir. 2006))). Second, Adams’ business conspiracy claim is meritless because
it alleges no “underlying unlawful act.” Allegheny Constr. Co., 86 Va. App. at 346. And third,
Adams fails in its second amended complaint to plead even the basic elements of inverse
condemnation. For instance, it does not argue that its property was “taken by a body with
condemnation authority,” nor does it suggest that the alleged taking “was for a public use.”
Town of Iron Gate v. Simpson, 82 Va. App. 38, 52 (2024); see Coward v. Wellmont Health Sys.,
295 Va. 351, 367 (2019) (“[W]here a party fails to develop an argument in support of his or her
contention or merely constructs a skeletal argument, the issue is waived.”). Jump to an indexed page (13 of 13)