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an individual because of that individual’s sex. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1). Hux acknowledges that she can proffer no direct evidence of
discrimination, and so elects to proceed under the burden-shifting
scheme set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973), and its progeny. See, e.g., Hawkins v. Pepsico, Inc., 203 F.3d
274, 278 (4th Cir. 2000). Plaintiff first must make out a prima facie
case of discrimination, see McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at
802, and we will assume that Hux has done so here. The burden then
shifts to the City to give a legitimate, non-discriminatory justification
for its decision. See, e.g., Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc.,
530 U.S. 133, 142 (2000). The City has met this burden by providing
evidence that it did not promote Hux to Fire Captain because male
candidates were better qualified. See, e.g., Evans v. Techs. Applica-
tions & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 960 (4th Cir. 1996). As a result, Hux
must show that this proffered explanation is pretext for intentional
discrimination. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 142-43. "A plaintiff alleging
a failure to promote can prove pretext by showing that [she] was bet-
ter qualified, or by amassing circumstantial evidence that otherwise
undermines the credibility of the employer’s stated reasons." Heiko v.
Colombo Savings Bank, F.S.B., 434 F.3d 249, 259 (4th Cir. 2006).
The general standards for summary judgment naturally inform any
assessment of whether a plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence of
pretext such that her case may proceed to trial. See, e.g., Anderson v.
Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.3d 248, 272 (4th Cir. 2005);
Mereish v. Walker, 359 F.3d 330, 339 (4th Cir. 2004). As the
Supreme Court has made clear, "trial courts should not ‘treat discrimi-
nation differently from other ultimate questions of fact.’" Reeves, 530
U.S. at 148 (quoting St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,
524 (1993)). Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), summary
judgment is appropriate when "there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law." Together, the genuineness and materiality require-
ments express the sound proposition that litigation for its own sake
is not a judicious use of resources. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 327 (1986).
The summary judgment standards mesh comfortably with the
McDonnell Douglas framework. Once an employer has provided a
non-discriminatory explanation for its decision, the plaintiff cannot
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