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D.A. Realestate Investment, LLC v. City of Norfolk (2025)

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in his opening brief that the federal constitutional claims are “[n]ot subject to this appeal.” Fox Br. at 11 n.4.5 Likewise, he abandoned any appeal of the district court’s SCRA ruling by failing to raise such contentions in his opening brief. See Grayson O Co., 856 F.3d at 316. Fox’s Statement of Issues does not mention the SCRA, and his opening brief only obliquely references the district court’s SCRA ruling once. This passing shot does not preserve the SCRA issue for appeal. Id. 6 Thus, the only issue before us is whether Fox showed any genuine dispute of material fact related to his Virginia inverse condemnation claim. Even if Fox had appealed these claims, precedent directs us to affirm the district 5 court’s conclusion that they are time-barred. Section 1983 lacks its own statute of limitations, so courts borrow the limitations period “from the most analogous state-law cause of action.” See Owens v. Balt. City State’s Att’ys Off., 767 F.3d 379, 388 (4th Cir. 2014). “For § 1983 suits, that cause of action is a personal-injury suit.” Id.; see Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). And Virginia has a two-year limitations period for personal injury suits. Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-243(A). Fox learned of the house’s demolition in late 2018 and contacted the city about it in early 2019. He filed suit in December 2021, almost three years later. For servicemembers “to devote their entire energy to the defense needs of the 6 Nation,” the SCRA “provide[s] for [] temporary suspension of judicial and administrative proceedings and transactions that may adversely affect the civil rights of servicemembers during their military service.” 50 U.S.C. § 3902; see DARI I, 2023 WL 2637382, at *7. We agree with the district court’s conclusion that no “default judgment” within the meaning of § 3931 was entered against Fox. Id. at *8; see Fodge v. Trustmark Nat’l Bank, 945 F.3d 880, 882 n.1 (5th Cir. 2019). The city’s nuisance determination was not a “civil action or proceeding” resulting in a default judgment. See DARI I, 2023 WL 2637382, at *8. And § 4042’s private right of action simply authorizes a suit when another provision of the SCRA is violated. Id. So even if not abandoned, we would affirm the district court’s denial of SCRA relief. 10
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